In a telephone conversation with a state legislator who at the time was
Speaker of her state's House of Representatives, and who had been quoted
in a newspaper saying she was proud to have sponsored legislation
requiring health insurance policies to pay for psychiatric treatment, I
referred to people being "accused of mental illness." She disagreed
with or corrected me, saying "It's not an accusation. It's a
diagnosis."
People who disagree with the concept of mental illness and
with the associated idea of psychiatric diagnosis call psychiatric
diagnoses "labels". Such critics allege psychiatric "diagnoses" or
labels are no more scientifically valid than pejorative nonscientific
insults. As psychologist Jeffrey Schaler said in 2006, "Think of how
when people get angry with one another, they inevitably resort to some
kind of diagnosis. They say, 'You're crazy! You're mentally ill!
You're paranoid!' Can you imagine somebody getting angry with someone
and saying 'You have diabetes! You have Parkinson's Disease!'"
("Jeffrey A. Schaler, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology", YouTube.com,
accessed Sept. 1, 2012). Accusing someone of mental illness is an
insult. Accusing someone of having diabetes or Parkinson's Disease or
any other physical illness is not.
Because we do not live our lives in isolation but in a
society of other people, and because a psychiatric "diagnosis" changes
how other people treat a person, a psychiatric "diagnosis" can deprive a
person of many of life's most important opportunities and can harm or
ruin a person's life. The childhood taunt, "Sticks and stones can
break my bones, but words can never hurt me" simply is not true if the
words are a psychiatric "diagnosis":
The problem with psychiatric diagnoses is not that they
are meaningless, but that they may be, and often are, swung as semantic
blackjacks: cracking the subject's dignity and respectability destroys
him just as effectively as cracking his skull. The difference is that
the man who wields a blackjack is recognized by everyone as a thug, but
the one who wields a psychiatric diagnoses is not. [Thomas Szasz, M.D., The Second Sin, Anchor Press 1973, p. 71]
Psychiatric "diagnosis" can result in a person who seems normal to the
average person, and who is law-abiding, spending his or her whole life
imprisoned in a mental institution rather than living in freedom.
Psychiatric "diagnosis" can defeat the proper functioning of the system
of justice, examples being a person being found not guilty by reason of
insanity and avoiding punishment for a serious crime, or a good parent
losing custody of his or her child. (See, for example, Chapter 8 "In
the Best Interests of the Child—Parental Rights and Psychoexperts" in
Whores of the Court: The Fraud of Psychiatric Testimony and the Rape of American Justice,
Regan/HarperCollins 1997, by Boston University psychology professor
Margaret Hagen, Ph.D.) Psychologist Paula Caplan, Ph.D., highlighted
the gravity of psychiatric "diagnosis" in an interview on February 11,
2012 (MindFreedom Live Free Web Radio: "Paula Caplan v. Psychiatric
Labeling!", archived at blogtalkradio.com):
Not until recently did very many people understand that
psychiatric diagnosis is the fundamental building block of everything
else bad that happens in the mental health system. If you don't get a
label, you can't get put on drugs that might help you but are more
likely to hurt you. If you don't get a label, then you can't lose your
job or custody of your kids or your legal rights because of having a
label. ... When you hear somebody say "I lost custody of my children
because I had a label that I thought was pretty mild, but you know
what!: It 'proved' that I'm mentally ill, and they took my children away
from me." ... You can't hear these stories, and year after year, more
and more, and not try to do something about it. ... people's lives have
been destroyed by getting a psychiatric label.
In his book
Saving Normal: An Insider's Revolt Against Out-of-Control
Psychiatric Diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the Medicalization of
Ordinary Life, published in 2013 (Harper Collins pp. xi, xii, 277), psychiatrist Allen Frances, M.D., says this:
I led the Task Force that developed DSM-IV [American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition]
and also chaired the department of psychiatry at Duke [University],
treated many patients ... DSM has gained a huge societal significance
and determines all sorts of important things that have an enormous
impact on people's lives like...who gets to be hired for a job, can
adopt a child, or pilot a plane, or qualifies for life insurance
... Done poorly, psychiatric diagnosis can be an unmitigated disaster
leading to aggressive treatments with horrible complications and
life-shattering impact. ... Psychiatric diagnosis is a serious
business with major and often lifelong consequences.
In Chapter 3 of
Saving Normal, "Diagnostic Inflation", Dr.
Frances includes a section quite appropriately titled "The Power to
Label Is the Power to Destroy" (p. 109).
Because of the damaging, even life-ruining power of
psychiatric "diagnosis" (or of psychiatric "labels"), the validity,
accuracy, reliability, and predictability of psychiatric "diagnosis" is
important. Investigations repeatedly reveal psychiatric diagnosis has
no reliability or validity.
In 1887 Nellie Bly (1867-1922), a newspaper reporter,
feigned insanity to gain admission to New York's Blackwell's Island
Insane Asylum. She described how she did it and what she saw at the
Asylum in a book titled
Ten Days in a Mad House (available from
amazon.com
and free on the Internet). "I had little belief in my ability to
deceive the insanity experts," she wrote in Chapter 1, and in Chapter 2,
"to be examined by a number of learned physicians who make insanity a
specialty, and who daily come in contact with insane people! How could I
hope to pass these doctors and convince them that I was crazy?"
In
Chapter 6, while at Bellevue Hospital, after it was apparent she had
succeeded, before her transfer to Blackwell's Island, she wrote: "And so
I passed my second medical expert. After this I began to have a
smaller regard for the ability of doctors than I ever had before, and a
greater one for myself. I felt sure now that no doctor could tell
whether people were insane or not".
In chapter 7, listening to Tillie Mayard, a fellow patient
at Bellevue Hospital, who had just found out she was in an insane
asylum, after being told she was going to a "convalescent ward to be
treated for nervous debility", Nellie Bly heard Ms. Mayard say to a
doctor, "If you know anything at all you should be able to tell that I
am perfectly sane. Why don't you test me?" Bly said the doctor "left
the poor girl condemned to an insane asylum, probably for life, without
giving her one feeble chance to prove her sanity." In Chapter 8, Bly
describes this same Tillie Mayard pleading with a doctor after arriving
at Blackwell's Island Insane Asylum:
I could hear her gently but firmly pleading her case.
All her remarks were as rational as any I ever heard, and I thought no
good physician could help but be impressed with her story. ... She
begged that they try all their tests for insanity, if they had any, and
give her justice. Poor girl, how my heart ached for her! I determined
then and there that I would try by every means to make my mission of
benefit to my suffering sisters; that I would show how they are
committed without ample trial.
Of herself, Bly wrote in Chapter 1, "From the moment I entered the
insane ward on the Island, I made no attempt to keep up the assumed
role
of insanity. I talked and acted just as I do in ordinary life. Yet
strange to say, the more sanely I talked and acted, the crazier I was
thought to be by all except one physician, whose kindness and gentle
ways I shall not soon forget." Of her own departure from Blackwell's
Island, after intervention by her editor, she said:
I left the insane ward with pleasure and regret—pleasure
that I was once more able to enjoy the free breath of heaven; regret
that I could not have brought with me some of the unfortunate women who
lived and suffered with me, and who, I am convinced, are just as sane as
I was and am now myself.
A similar experiment was done in the 1970s by Stanford
University psychology professor David Rosenhan and his colleagues and
published in the January 19, 1973 issue of
Science magazine ("On
Being Sane in Insane Places", Vol. 179, pp. 250-258). Dr. Rosenhan and
seven of his colleagues who had no history of or evidence of mental
illness, called "pseudopatients" in the study, went to 12 different
psychiatric hospitals on the East and West coasts of the U.S.A. as
inpatients where they remained as long as 52 days. They found that no
matter how normally they behaved they were not recognized as normal by
the psychiatrists and other mental health professionals they came in
contact with. Despite being normal, all were prescribed psychiatric
drugs: "All told, the [eight] pseudopatients were administered nearly
2100 pills, including Elavil, Stelazine, Compazine, and Thorazine",
which undermines the commonly held belief psychiatric drugs are given
only to people who need them (as if
anybody needs psychiatric drugs: See
Psychiatric Drugs: Cure or Quackery?)
When the results of this experiment were revealed to the psychiatrists
and other staff members of another psychiatric hospital, they "doubted
that such an error could occur at their hospital." Dr. Rosenhan said
"The staff was informed that at some time during the following 3 months,
one or more pseudopatients would attempt to be admitted into the
psychiatric hospital." During that time the hospital staff identified
"Forty-one patients...with high confidence, to be pseudopatients
... Twenty-three were considered suspect by at least one
psychiatrist. ... Actually," said Dr. Rosenhan, "no genuine
pseudopatient (at least not from my group) presented himself during this
period." Dr. Rosenhan concluded the inability of psychiatrists and
other mental health professionals to distinguish normal persons such as
himself and his colleagues from true mental patients is "frightening."
He said:
How many people, one wonders, are sane but not
recognized as such in our psychiatric institutions? How many have been
needlessly stripped of their privileges of citizenship, from the right
to vote and drive to that of handling their own accounts? How many
have feigned insanity in order to avoid the criminal consequences of
their behavior, and conversely, how many would rather stand trial than
live interminably in a psychiatric hospital but are wrongly thought to
be mentally ill? How many have been stigmatized by well-intentioned,
but nevertheless erroneous, diagnoses?
In his book
Psychiatry: The Science of Lies
(Syracuse University Press 2008, pp. 67-68), psychiatry professor Thomas
Szasz, M.D., says "The assertion rests on an erroneous premise, namely,
that the doctors were interested in distinguishing insane inmates
properly committed from sane inmates falsely detained. The whole
history of psychiatry belies this assumption. ... each time experience
was consulted, it showed that the experts were unable to distinguish
the sane from the insane".
The following described study titled "Suggestion Effects in
Psychiatric Diagnosis" by psychologist Maurice K. Temerlin, Ph.D., was
published in
The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease in 1968
(Vol. 147, No. 4, pp. 349-353): "In order to explore interpersonal
influences which might affect psychiatric diagnosis, psychiatrists,
clinical psychologists and graduate students in clinical psychology
diagnosed a sound-recorded interview with a normal, healthy man." When a
group of psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychology graduate students
heard the tape-recorded interview after introductory remarks by "a
professional person of high prestige" saying the interview was with a
perfectly healthy man, the "psychologists, psychiatrists, and graduate
students agreed unanimously." When the tape-recording was heard by a
group of psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychology graduate students
after introductory remarks by "a professional person of high prestige"
saying the recorded interview was with a man who "'looked neurotic but
actually was quite psychotic' ... diagnoses of psychosis were made by 60
per cent of the psychiatrists, 28 per cent of the clinical
psychologists, and 11 per cent of the graduate students", even though
they had listened to the same tape-recording. This study like others
shows psychiatric "diagnosis" has no reliability and no validity.
It is probably because nothing can be found wrong in the
body including brain of supposedly mentally ill people, and because
psychiatry has no biological tests distinguishing people who have
so-called mental illnesses from those who do not, and therefore has no
genuine illnesses or diseases to describe or "diagnose", that the
American Psychiatric Association calls its manual the "Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders", not the "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Illnesses" nor the "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Diseases". Even calling it a "diagnostic" manual is pretentious and factually incorrect if true diagnosis indicates the
cause of a problem. The "diagnoses" in the DSM do not do that. The
DSM is a manual of
descriptions, not
diagnoses.
It could be more accurately named the American Psychiatric
Association's "Mental Disorders Description Manual", or even more
candidly, the American Psychiatric Association's "Disapproved Behavior
Description Manual".
_________________________________________________
THE DSM IS A MANUAL OF DESCRIPTIONS, NOT DIAGNOSES
_______________________________________________________
The word "disorder" is the word "order" with the prefix
"dis-", which means the opposite of. "Disorder" therefore is the
opposite of order. To say something is "dis"-order is to say the
opposite is proper. But who is to say what is proper behavior? Is it
right for a private unelected organization to decide what behavior is
permitted? Isn't that the responsibility of democratically elected law
makers or legislators? Why should a private unelected organization
such as the American Psychiatric Association (APA) be empowered to say
what behavior is allowed and what behavior is prohibited in America or
anywhere else?
Who are they? Does the fact that the APA
defines as "Hording Disorder" the keeping of so many belongings in your
house or apartment they "congest and clutter active living areas and
substantially compromises their intended use" (
DSM-5, p. 247)
mean you don't have a right to keep as many belongings in your home as
you want? This isn't merely theoretical: I have a video court reporter
record (on DVD) of a 72 year old man in Vancouver, Washington who
seemed entirely normal and very intelligent in a one-hour,
face-to-face interview with me in 2011 but who had shortly before been
placed and was still under an involuntary guardianship imposed in
large part because he supposedly had a "hording disorder." An article
in
Carol's Home News (October 2011, p. 2) says "Are you a night
owl? ... It's not laziness, or simple insomnia, but a condition
doctors call Delayed Sleep Phase (DSP) Disorder." In
DSM-5,
published a year and half after the quoted article, it is called one of
the "Circadian Rhythm Sleep-Wake Disorders" (p. 390), specifically
"Delayed Sleep Phase Type". It is defined as "a history of a delay in
the timing of the major sleep period (usually more than 2 hours) in
relation to the desired sleep and wake-up time", even though "When
allowed to set their own schedule, individuals with delayed sleep phase
type exhibit normal sleep quality and duration for age" (p. 391). Does a
group of doctors deciding going to sleep at 4 a.m. and sleeping until
noon is a disorder mean you don't have the right to sleep the hours you
want? Should you be subjected to involuntary treatment if you do?
Legislators' delegation of their law-making power to a private
organization such as the American Psychiatric Association or to
individual physicians, as legislators have with laws authorizing
involuntary "hospitalization" or involuntary outpatient "treatment" of
people whose behavior or expression of ideas (or sleep schedule) falls
within a category of the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is an arguably illegal, unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
Persons no less authoritative than the chairpersons of
groups that created the third and fourth editions of the American
Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and their revisions (
DSM-III,
DSM-III-R,
DSM-IV and
DSM-IV-TR) have admitted the scientific invalidity their own (supposedly) diagnostic systems. In the Foreword to
The Loss of Sadness—How Psychiatry Transformed Normal Sorrow Into Depressive Disorder
by Alan V. Horwitz, Ph.D., and Jerome C. Wakefield, Ph.D., D.S.W.
(Oxford University Press 2007, pp. vii-viii), Robert L. Spitzer, M.D.,
Professor of Psychiatry at New York State Psychiatric Institute says
this:
I was the head of the American Psychiatric Association's
task force that in 1980 created the DSM-III (i.e., the third edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the
Association's official listing of recognized mental disorders and the
criteria by which they are diagnosed). ... the very success of the DSM
and its descriptive [as opposed to diagnostic] criteria at a
practical level has allowed the field of psychiatry to ignore some basic
conceptual issues that have been lurking at the foundation of the DSM
enterprise, especially the question of how to distinguish disorder from
normal suffering. ... My involvement in an earlier debate over whether
to remove homosexuality from DSM-II in 1973 led me to grapple with the
question of how to define mental disorder. I formulated the definitions
of mental disorder in the introductions to the DSM-III, the DSM-III-R
(the DSM's third edition revised), and the DSM-IV, which aim to explain
the reasons that certain conditions were included in and other types of
problems excluded from the Manual. Since then, Dr. Wakefield has
critiqued my efforts in ways that I have largely become convinced are
valid.
Allen Frances, M.D., was chairperson of the American Psychiatric Association's
DSM-IV Task Force, making him the lead author and editor of
DSM-IV (1994) and
DSM-IV-TR
(2000). Psychologist Paula Caplan, Ph.D., in her presentation at the
2012 National Association for Rights Protection and Advocacy Conference,
accused Dr. Frances of being the single person most responsible for the
pathologizing of normality in psychiatry (at least, prior to the
publication of
DSM-5). However, in a series of articles criticizing the newest version,
DSM-5,
many of them available at psychologytoday.com and psychiatrictimes.com
and elsewhere on the Internet, Dr. Frances has vigorously criticized
the lack of science and the pathologizing of normality in
DSM-5, much of the time seemingly overlooking the fact that many of his criticisms are equally true of
DSM-IV and
DSM-IV-TR for which he as much as anyone is responsible. Many silly supposed diagnoses in
DSM-5 are also found in
DSM-IV and
DSM-IV-TR:
I'll be giving you examples later in this essay. At other times,
however, Dr. Frances has accepted responsibility for the psychiatric
pathologizing of normal people. In a lecture at the University of
Toronto on May 6, 2012, Dr. Frances said "I'm responsible for some of
these changes, and in some cases I'm not too proud of the results ...
mea culpa ... We're giving too much treatment to people who don't need
it" ("Allen J. Frances on the overdiagnosis of mental illness",
YouTube.com, at 2:55, 11:00 & 29:30). In his book
Saving
Normal—An Insider's Revolt Against Out-of-Control Psychiatric Diagnosis,
DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the Medicalization of Ordinary Life, Dr. Frances says his own
DSM-IV
"probably resulted in more harm than good ... DSM-IV did not save
normal, or even protect it very well. ... Our [the DSM-IV Task Force's]
changes contributed directly to the false epidemics of autistic,
attention deficit, and adult bipolar disorder, and we did nothing to
prevent the overdiagnosis of several other disorders" (HarperCollins
2013, pp. xiv, 73, 75). On November 8, 2011 he said "Since the DSM-5
suggestions will all broaden the definition of mental disorder, why
should we not worry about
diagnostic inflation and the massive
mislabeling of normal people as mentally ill?" ("APA Responds Lamely to
the Petition to Reform DSM-5", psychiatrictimes.com, bold print in
original). In an article titled "The User's Revolt Against DSM-5: Will
It Work?", psychiatrictimes.com, on November 10, 2011, Dr. Frances wrote
"When it comes to DSM-5, experience has proven conclusively that the
American Psychiatric Association (APA) will not attend to the science,
evaluate the risks, or listen to reason. A user's revolt has become the
last and only hope for derailing the worst of the DSM-5 suggestions.
...DSM-5 is such a mess."
Let's look at examples of what Dr. Frances is talking about
that show how unbelievably broad he and his colleagues and successors
at the American Psychiatric Association have made the concept of mental
illness or disorder. Open almost any page of
DSM-5 and it
becomes apparent the psychiatrists and others who wrote it appended the
term "disorder" or "syndrome" to the words or phrases that describe
almost all of life's ordinary and normal problems, challenges, and
temptations, regardless of how minor. In addition to carrying forward
supposed disorders in
DSM-IV-TR few persons outside psychiatry would consider mental illness or disorder,
DSM-5 creates more.
One of the new mental disorders created with the publication of
DSM-5
in 2013 is "Tobacco Use Disorder". You probably never thought a person
who enjoys smoking cigarettes, pipes, or cigars, or using chewing
tobacco has a mental disorder for only that reason, but now that
DSM-5
has been published, they do. The "Diagnostic Criteria" for "Tobacco
Use Disorder" (p. 571) say a person has the disorder (or illness?) if he
or she manifests at least 2 of 11 criteria. The first 4 of the 11 are:
"1. Tobacco is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period
than was intended."; "2. There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful
efforts to cut down on or control tobacco use"; "3. A great deal of time
is spent in activities necessary to obtain or use tobacco"; "4.
Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use tobacco." Probably all
tobacco users qualify as mentally disordered under these criteria.
In
DSM-IV-TR (p. 631) and
DSM-5 (p. 404), nightmares that cause you distress qualify you as having a mental disorder. In
DSM-5
"Nightmare Disorder" is defined as "Repeated occurrences of extended,
extremely dysphoric, and well-remembered dreams that usually involve
efforts to avoid threats to survival, security, or physical integrity"
even if "On awakening from the dysphoric dreams, the individual rapidly
becomes oriented and alert" if "The sleep disturbance causes clinically
significant distress..."
Going to bed late and sleeping late is a "Circadian Rhythm Sleep Disorder...Delayed Sleep Phase Type" in both
DSM-IV-TR (2000, p. 622) and
DSM-5
(2013, pp. 390-391), but what if you're an early riser? Might that
also be a "disorder"? Yes, in this case the diagnosis (actually
description) is "Circadian Rhythm Sleep-Wake Disorder ... Advanced
Sleep-Wake Type" (
DSM-5, p. 393; in
DSM-IV-TR, p. 624, it is one of the "Unspecified Type" Circadian Rhythm Sleep Disorders).
DSM-5
says "Advanced sleep phase type is characterized by sleep-wake times
that are several hours earlier than desired or conventional times" and
that "Individuals with advanced sleep phase type are 'morning types'"
(p. 393). According to psychiatry's current "diagnostic" standards, if
you don't sleep and wake up at "conventional times" you have a mental
disorder.
Lying or malingering is not just a moral problem but is "Factitious Disorder" in both
DSM-IV-TR (p. 517) and
DSM-5 (pp. 324-325).
In
DSM-5 (p. 462) the criteria for "Oppositional
Defiant Disorder", a supposed disorder in children, include "Often loses
temper. ... Is often touchy or easily annoyed. ... is often angry and
resentful" but only "with at least one individual who is not a sibling."
In
DSM-5, arguing with siblings is okay, but if you are a
child, arguing with a parent or an adult means you have a mental
disorder. Oppositional Defiant Disorder also appears in
DSM-IV-TR (p. 102) but without the exemption for arguing with siblings.
Becoming angry too often is "Intermittent Explosive Disorder" in
DSM-IV-TR (p. 663) and
DSM-5 (p. 466).
Do you or have you ever suspected your spouse or intimate
partner of infidelity? In that case you have or had "Obsessional
jealousy", a subtype of "Other Specified Obsessive-Compulsive and
Related Disorder" defined as "nondelusional preoccupation with a
partner's perceived infidelity" (pp. 263-264). No, that's not a
misprint: This particular disorder is defined as "
nondelusional", but it is still a mental disorder in
DSM-5, as if a person should not care very much about a spouse's or intimate partner's infidelity.
Do you often like to get yourself a midnight snack? In
that case you have "Night eating syndrome" defined as "Recurrent
episodes of night eating, as manifested by eating after awakening from
sleep or by excessive food consumption after the evening meal" (
DSM-5, p. 354).
In
DSM-5, "General Personality Disorder" (p. 646) is
defined as "An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that
deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture."
What does conformity with the expectations of the individual's culture
have to do with health?
Consider "Social Anxiety Disorder (Social Phobia)":
DSM-5
(pp. 203) says "The essential feature of social anxiety disorder is a
marked, or intense, fear or anxiety of social situations in which the
individual may be scrutinized by others" one example being "performing
in front of others (e.g., giving a speech)."
DSM-5 (p. 203, bold print in original) says "
Specify if:
Performance only:
If the fear is restricted to speaking or performing in public." That
used to be called "stage fright". Now it is, supposedly, a mental
disorder. Stage fright is uncomfortable, but is it a "disorder"? Isn't
it normal?
According to Tony Dokoupil in his article "Is the Onslaught Making Us Crazy?", (
Newsweek, July 16, 2012, p. 24 at 27-28):
When the new DSM [DSM-5] is released next year
[2013], Internet Addiction Disorder will be included for the first time,
albeit in an appendix tagged "for further study." China, Taiwan, and
Korea recently accepted the diagnosis, and began treating problematic
Web use as a grave national health crisis. ... two psychiatrists in
Taiwan made headlines with the idea of iPhone addiction disorder.
"Internet Addiction Disorder" does not appear in the index of the final published edition of
DSM-5, and I'm not finding it anwhere in the book. In
Saving Normal
(p. 225), Dr. Frances says "DSM-5 finally did back down on many of its
worst suggestions when these were scorched in the press." While the
DSM-5 Task Force may have been shamed or ridiculed out of the idea of
Internet Addiction Disorder, "Internet Gaming Disorder" does appear in
DSM-5 as a proposal requiring further study. The "Proposed Criteria" for Internet Gaming Disorder (pp. 795-796) are as follows:
Persistent and recurrent use of the Internet to engage
in games, often with other players, leading to clinically significant
impairment or distress as indicated by five (or more) of the following
in a 12 month period:
1. Preoccupation with Internet games. (The individual thinks about
previous gaming activity or anticipates playing the next game; Internet
gaming becomes the dominant activity in daily life).
Note: This disorder is distinct from Internet gambling, which is included under gambling disorder.
2. Withdrawal symptoms when Internet gaming is taken away.
(These symptoms are typically described as irritability, anxiety, or
sadness, but there are no physical signs of pharmacological withdrawal.)
3. Tolerance—the need to spend increasing amounts of time engaged in Internet games.
4. Unsuccessful attempts to control the participation in Internet games.
5. Loss of interests in previous hobbies and entertainment as a result of, and with the exception of, Internet games.
6. Continued excessive use of Internet games despite knowledge of psychosocial problems.
7. Has deceived family members, therapists, or others regarding the amount of Internet gaming.
8. Use of Internet games to escape or relieve a negative mood (e.g., feelings of helplessness, guilt, or anxiety).
9. Has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or
educational or career opportunity because of participation in Internet
games.
Note: Only nongambling Internet games are included in this
disorder. Use of the Internet for required activities in a business or
profession is not included, nor is the disorder intended to include
other recreational or social Internet use. Similarly, sexual Internet
sites are excluded.
As mentioned in the above proposed criteria for Internet Gaming Disorder, "Gambling Disorder" also appears in
DSM-5, and not merely as one of the "Conditions for Further Study". Gambling Disorder is listed in
DSM-5 (pp. 585-589) as a 100% valid and not merely proposed mental disorder. In
DSM-IV-TR (2000) it was called "Pathological Gambling" (p. 671). Gambling Disorder in
DSM-5
has "Diagnostic Criteria" that are similar to those for internet Gaming
Disorder: "Persistent and recurrent problematic gambling behavior
leading to clinically significant impairment or distress ... Has made
repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop
gambling. ... Lies to conceal the extent of involvement with gambling"
(etc.)
In an article published on psychiatrictimes.com on August 14, 2012, Dr. Frances says this:
DSM-5 proposes to introduce a category of "Behavioral
Addictions," with gambling as the first member and Internet addiction
standing next in line to become a possible second. Behavioral
Addictions could eventually easily expand to include passionate
attachments to many other common activities. If we can be addicted to
gambling and the Internet, why not also include addictions to shopping,
excise, sex, work, golf, sunbathing, model railroading, you name it?
All passionate interests are at risk for redefinition as mental
disorders. ... It should not be counted as a mental disorder and be
called an "addiction" just because you really love an activity, get a
lot of pleasure from it, and spend a lot of time doing it. ... It is
not "addiction" whenever someone gets into trouble because of
over-spending, golfing too much, or having repeated sexual
indiscretions. That's our human nature, derived from many millions of
years of evolutionary experience...
The title of the above quoted article is "Internet Addiction: The Next New Fad Diagnosis". In his book
Saving Normal,
Dr. Frances says "Fads in psychiatric diagnosis come and go. All of a
sudden everyone seems to have the same problem. Quack theories explain
the outbreak; quack treatments presume to provide cure. ...
psychiatric diagnosis has always been, and still is, so faddish" (pp.
117 & 136). Harvard psychiatry professor Blaise A. Aguirre, M.D.,
makes a similar observation in his book
Borderline Personality Disorder in Adolescents (Fair Winds Press 2007, p. 15):
Psychiatric diagnoses appear to be like cultural fads
that come and go. There was a time in child and adolescent psychiatry
when everyone had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and then
everyone had bipolar disorder, then Asperger's syndrome, and surely the
next big diagnosis will come and go.
Can you imagine a physician saying "There was a time in medicine when we
diagnosed everyone as having cancer, and then we started diagnosing
everyone as having heart disease, and then we decided everyone had
diabetes"? Dr. Aguirre blames "problems in diagnosing psychiatric
disorders and the general absence of accurate diagnostic tools and
procedures" in psychiatry (
Id).
Appearing for the first time in
DSM-5 is a childhood disorder called "Disinhibited social Engagement Disorder" (
DSM-5,
pp. 268-270). Like Gambling Disorder, General Personality Disorder,
and Social Anxiety Disorder, Disinhibited Social Engagement Disorder is
listed as a 100% valid and not merely proposed mental disorder.
According to DSM-5, "The essential feature of disinhibited social
engagement disorder is a pattern of behavior that involves culturally
inappropriate, overly familiar behavior with relative strangers
(Criterion A)." The "Diagnostic Criteria" for this supposed disorder
are as follows:
A. A pattern of behavior in which a child actively
approaches and interacts with unfamiliar adults and exhibits at least
two of the following:
1. Reduced or absent reticence in approaching and interacting with unfamiliar adults.
2. Overly familiar verbal or physical behavior (that is not consistent
with culturally sanctioned and with age-appropriate social boundaries).
3. Diminished or absent checking back with adult caregiver after venturing away, even in unfamiliar settings.
4. Willingness to go off with an unfamiliar adult with minimal or no hesitation.
B. The behaviors in Criterion A are not limited to impulsivity (as
in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder) but include socially
disinhibited behavior.
C. The child has experienced a pattern of extremes of insufficient care as evidenced by one of the following:
1. Social neglect or deprivation in the form of persistent lack of
having basic emotional needs for comfort, stimulation, and affection met
by caregiving adults.
2. Repeated changes of primary caregivers that limit opportunities to
form stable attachments (e.g., frequent changes in foster care).
3. Rearing in unusual settings that severely limit opportunities to
form selective attachments (e.g., institutions with high
child-to-caregiver ratios).
D. The care in Criterion C is presumed to be responsible for the
disturbed behavior in Criterion A (e.g., the disturbances in Criterion A
began following the pathogenic care in Criterion C).
E. The child has a developmental age of at least 9 months.
Such supposedly diagnostic criteria obviously have nothing to do with
real illness, disease, disorder, or any biological problem and are only
deviance from what is considered wise or expected behavior, along with
psychological theorizing about how a young person learned to behave this
way. Frequent changes in adult care givers, making a young person too
comfortable with new, unfamiliar adults, becomes "pathogenic".
The lack of anything abnormal from a biological perspective is also apparent in the sex-related "diagnoses" in
DSM-5, some of which are amusing:
DSM-5 includes "Voyeuristic Disorder", defined as
"recurrent and intense sexual arousal from observing an unsuspecting
person who is naked, in the process of disrobing, or engaging in sexual
activity, as manifested by fantasies, urges, or behaviors" (p. 686).
Perhaps this could have been called Peeping Tom Disorder. (If
manifested only by fantasies or urges, and not actual behavior, it could
and I think should be considered a type of Orwellian thought crime.)
Exhibitionism, a relatively minor sex crime that is still
found in the penal codes of many states of the U.S.A., is now a mental
disorder. In
DSM-5, "Exhibitionistic Disorder" is defined as
"recurrent and intense sexual arousal from the exposure of one's
genitals to an unsuspecting person" (p. 689).
DSM-5 defines "Frotteuristic Disorder" as "recurrent
and intense sexual arousal from touching or rubbing against a
nonconsenting person" (p. 691). In
DSM-IV-TR it was called "Frotteurism" (p. 570). When I was a teenager this was called "copping a feel". Now it's a mental disorder.
If Frotteurism or Frotteuristic Disorder is a diagnosable
mental disorder, why isn't rape? In fact that proposal has been made.
In
Whores of the Court: The Fraud of Psychiatric Testimony and the Rape of American Justice
(Harper Collins 1997, p. 286) psychology professor Margaret A. Hagen,
Ph.D., says the "American Psychiatric Association almost put the
'uncontrollable' desire to rape in the last DSM as a mental disorder.
Perhaps it will make it into the next [fifth] edition." It didn't, but
if rape ever does make it into a future edition of the
DSM, maybe it will be called Paraphilic Rape Disorder.
DSM-5
says "The term paraphilia denotes any intense and persistent sexual
interest other than sexual interest in genital stimulation or
preparatory fondling with phenotypically normal, physically mature,
consenting human partners" (p. 685, which after the American Psychiatric
Association vote de-illness-izing homosexuality in December 1973 may be
of either sex). Rape has in fact been called "Paraphilia Not Otherwise
Specified, Nonconsent" by some psychologists: According to psychiatrist
Allen Frances, M.D., "The proposal to create a mental disorder for
rapists has been raised and unequivocally rejected 5 times" by the
writers and editors of various editions of the DSM but "These repeated
repudiations haven't prevented poorly trained psychologists testifying
as alleged experts ... inventing the fake diagnosis 'Paraphilia Not
Otherwise Specified, Nonconsent' and using it as an excuse to justify
what are in fact unjustifiable psychiatric commitments" ("DSM-5 Confirms
That Rape Is Crime, Not Mental Disorder", psychiatrictimes.com,
February 23, 2013). However, there isn't much logic in including
Frotteuristic Disorder and not Rape Disorder as a "diagnosis", so the
reason we have Frotteuristic Disorder and not Rape Disorder in the
DSM
is probably more political and strategic than scientific: Defining rape
as a mental disorder would get too much attention and discrediting
news media coverage. It also would mean rapists are by definition
mentally ill or disordered and therefore not criminally responsible for
their crimes (and might cause legislators dumb enough to take
psychiatric "diagnosis" seriously to delete rape from state criminal
codes!)
Comedians will find a treasure trove of material in
DSM-5.
Dr. Frances' criticisms were for the most part ignored, and as
the 2013 publication date for DSM-5 approached, in an article published
February 13, 2013, Dr. Frances said this ("DSM5 in Distress",
psychologytoday.com):
DSM 5 remains a reckless and poorly written document
that will worsen diagnostic inflation, increase inappropriate treatment,
create stigma, and cause confusion among clinicians and the public.
... My view is that DSM 5 has taken a fatal hit internationally and is
greatly discredited in the US. ... My mission now changes. The people
working on DSM 5 are no longer my primary audience... My main job now
is to alert the public and clinicians on ways to contain diagnostic
exuberance and to fight back against excessive and misdirected treatment
for people who are essentially normal.
Psychologist Paula Caplan, Ph.D., on February 11, 2012 on
"MindFreedom (MF) Live Free Web Radio: Paul Caplan v. Psychiatric
Labeling!" (archived at blogtalkradio.com, at the 12 minute, 58 second
point), said this about the
DSM:
I started out as an advocate of the DSM because I
believed their advertising, that it was scientifically grounded, and
that it would help us help people, so that's why I was in that kind of
work. And then when I was on two committees of DSM-IV, I was just
horrified. One of my specialties is research methods, and I was
appalled to see that when the science is good, but it doesn't fit with
what they want, then they ignore it, they distort it, or they lie about
it. And when the science is awful, I mean just poorly done, then
they'll use that, if it fits with what they want to do.
In his book
Psychiatry: The Science of Lies (Syracuse University Press 2008, pp. 18-19) psychiatry professor Thomas Szasz, M.D., says "Modern psychiatry with its
Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of nonexisting diseases and their coercive cures is a monument to quackery on a scale undreamed of in the annals of medicine."
Psychiatrist Ronald W. Pies, M.D., in an article titled
"Can Psychiatry be Both A Medical Science and A Healing Art? The Case
of Polythetic Pluralism", published October 19, 2011, at
psychiatrictimes.com, said this:
...the last two DSMs [DSM-III and IV] can
hardly be seen as exemplars of instantiations of "the medical model."
As McHugh and Slaveney point out, DSM-III was primarily interested in enhancing diagnostic reliability—essentially,
agreement on diagnosis among observers—and not in establishing the
biological validity of any condition. Nor have biological factors been a
central (or even a peripheral) part of DSM criteria from DSM-III to the
expected DSM-5. [italics in original]
Similarly, Robert L. Spitzer, M.D., Chairperson of the American
Psychiatric Association's Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics in
the Introduction to
DSM-III (1980, p. 8) says this:
Diagnostic Criteria. Since in DSM-I, DSM-II,
and ICD-9 [International Classification of Diseases, 9th edition]
explicit criteria are not provided, the clinician is largely on his or
her own in defining the content and boundaries of the diagnostic
categories. In contrast, DSM-III provides specific diagnostic criteria
as guides for making each diagnosis since such criteria enhance interjudge reliability.
It should be understood, however, that for most of the categories the
diagnostic criteria are based on clinical judgment, and have not yet
been fully validated by data... [bold print in original, italics added]
Similarly, in his book
Saving Normal,
DSM-IV and
DSM-IV-TR
Task Force Chairperson Allen Frances says "Reliability means agreement
and consistency—will different clinicians seeing the same patient arrive
at the same diagnosis. Validity means truth" (Harper Collins 2013, p.
25). In an article in 2011 he says "For no apparent reason, the [
DSM-5]
field trials address the (really who cares) question of reliability and
will offer nothing at all on the (really essential) questions of
validity" ("DSM5 in Distress", psychologytoday.com, November 8, 2011).
Dr. Frances is right on this point: Only validity (truth) matters. If all the observers are
wrong,
their determinations or "diagnoses" have zero percent validity even if
they have 100% agreement and therefore 100% "reliability". For example,
at the time of the witch trials, inquisitors familiar with the criteria
in the
Malleus Maleficarum, a manual describing the
characteristics of witches, might have had 100% agreement on who was a
witch, but because witchcraft was a myth, and there were in fact no
witches, their determinations that certain persons were witches had zero
percent validity even if 100% of them were in agreement, and they
therefore had 100% "reliability". This is the situation in which modern
psychiatry, and those subjected to psychiatric "diagnosis" and
"treatment", find themselves: The concept of mental "illness" or
"disorder" is as invalid as the concept of witchcraft at the time of the
witch trials. Some critics have argued that the American Psychiatric
Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is similar to the
Malleus Maleficarum. For example, in his essay
Notes on Psychiatric Fascism, Don Weitz says "The DSM is the equivalent of the
Malleus Maleficarum
in the middle ages, which Spanish inquisitors used to identify, target,
stigmatize and burn witches and heretics"
(antipsychiatry.org/weitz2.htm, accessed June 10, 2013).
________________________________________________________
THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL "ILLNESS" OR "DISORDER"
IS AS INVALID
AS THE CONCEPT OF WITCHCRAFT
AT THE TIME OF THE WITCH TRIALS
________________________________________________________
According to U.S. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)
director Thomas Insel, M.D., in an article published on the NIMH web
site on April 29, 2013, "The strength of each of the editions of DSM has
been 'reliability' each edition has ensured that clinicians use the
same terms in the same ways. The weakness is its lack of validity."
For this reason, he says, the "NIMH will be re-orienting its research
away from DSM categories" ("Director's Blog: Transforming Diagnosis",
nimh.nih.gov). No less than America's preeminent mental health government agency has rejected American Psychiatric Association
DSM "diagnosis".
Unfortunately, Dr. Insel seeks to substitute an equally
invalid approach: In the same article he says "Mental disorders are
biological disorders involving brain circuits" and that the NIMH will
seek to create "a new nosology" that is more scientific than that of the
DSM, one based on biological factors. Because the defining
characteristic of a mental "illness" or "disorder" is merely
disapproval, and biology is no more the cause of mental illnesses or
disorders than electronics are the cause of bad television programs,
this NIMH effort is doomed to failure.
Contrary to Dr. Insel's observation, the
DSM-5 interjudge "reliability" results were actually poor, at least in the opinion of
DSM-IV and
DSM-IV-TR Task Force chairperson Allen Frances, M.D. In his book
Saving
Normal: An Insider's Revolt Against Out-of-Control Psychiatric
Diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the Medicalization of Ordinary Life (Harper Collins 2013, p. 175) Dr. Frances says this:
APA [American Psychiatric Association] flunked -
instead of admitting that its reliability results were unacceptable and
seeking the necessary corrections that might meet historical standards,
the goalposts were moved. Declaring by fiat that previous expectations
were too high, DSM-5 announced it would accept agreements among raters
that were sometimes barely better than two monkeys throwing darts at a
diagnostic board.
In an article titled "A Response to 'How Reliable Is Reliable Enough?'"
published at psychiatrictimes.com on January 18, 2012, Dr. Frances says-
In the past, "acceptable" meant kappas of 0.6 or above.
... For DSM-5, 'acceptable' reliability has been reduced to a
startling 0.2-0.4. This barely exceeds the level of agreement you might
expect to get by pure chance. ... Can "accepting" unacceptably poor
agreement uphold the integrity of psychiatric diagnosis?
So actually
DSM-5 "diagnosis" not only has no validity but also no "reliability".
Because of the lack general agreement in psychiatry exemplified by Dr. Frances' criticisms and rejection of
DSM-5
"diagnosis" by the National Institute of Mental Health, and because of
psychiatry's lack of scientific validity, psychiatric testimony does not
meet legal criteria for acceptance as scientific or expert evidence in
courts of law under either of the standards applied by courts in the
U.S.A., namely, the "general acceptance" standard of
Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) that is still used in some states, nor the scientific validity standard of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
509 U.S. 579 (1993) that applies in federal courts and other states of
the U.S.A. Courts should recognize this and stop accepting psychiatric
testimony. (See
Frye standard
in Wikipedia). Involuntary commitment law typically requires
commitments be based on "competent psychiatric testimony". For example,
Texas Constitution Article 1, Sec. 15-a provides that "No person shall
be committed as a person of unsound mind except on competent medical or
psychiatric testimony." However, there is no such thing as "competent
psychiatric testimony" any more than there is, for example, "competent
astrology testimony" or "competent palm reader testimony". In her book
Whores of the Court: The Fraud of Psychiatric Testimony and the Rape of American Justice
(ReganBooks 1997, p. 99), Boston University psychology professor
Margaret A. Hagen, Ph.D., says "Upon finishing graduate or medical
school" mental health professionals "are not trained to perform the
myriad tasks the legal system asks them to perform because no body of
knowledge exists to support such training." She says testimony in court
by mental health experts such as psychiatrists and psychologists "do
not even come close to meeting the current criteria for admissibility as
expert testimony demanded by our courts" (
Id., p. 301), and—
When the law welcomes the astrologer into the
courtroom as possessing the same status as the astronomer, when the
court listens to the priest with the same critical judgment it applies
to the testimony of the physicist, then and only then will the testimony
of clinical psychologists about the formation and functioning of the
human mind in general or in a particular individual make sense as expert
testimony. [Id., p. 301]
Dr. Hagen laments the fact that "we buy the accreditation of psychiatry
at medical schools as if it were on the same standing as any other
medical specialty" notwithstanding the fact that it is not (
Id.,
p. 303). She says "Judges and juries, the people alone, must decide
questions of insanity, competence, rehabilitation, custody, injury, and
disability without the help of psychological experts and their
fraudulent skills" (p. 313). Of psychiatrists
and psychologists as "expert" witnesses in court she says "That
courtroom diagnosticians ignore even the wispiest constraints of reality
in reaching their diagnoses is truly frightening" (
Id., p.
262). She says that by accepting psychiatrists and psychologists as
expert witnesses in court, "Society has created its own monster" (
Id., p. 310).
________________________________________________________
THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS "COMPETENT PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY" ANY MORE
THAN THERE IS "COMPETENT ASTROLOGY TESTIMONY" OR "COMPETENT PALM
READER TESTIMONY"
________________________________________________________
How much of a monster we have created by recognizing
psychiatric and psychological "diagnosis" as valid when it is not is
illustrated by Robyn M. Dawes, Ph.D., a psychology professor at
Carnegie-Mellon University, former head of the psychology department at
the University of Oregon, and former president of the Oregon
Psychological Association, in his book
House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth (Free Press 1994, p. 153-154). In his critique of psychological testing he says this:
I would like to offer the reader some advice here.
If a professional psychologist is "evaluating" you in a situation in
which you are at risk and asks you for responses to ink blots or to
incomplete sentences, or for a drawing of anything, walk out of that
psychologist's office. Going through with such an examination creates
the danger of having a serious decision made about you on totally
invalid grounds. ... Let me share an example of what can happen—it did
happen.
He goes on to tell a true story of a young woman whose IQ he tested as
126, placing her in the ninety-fifth percentile, meaning her
intelligence was superior to all but 5% of the population, who was
determined to need involuntary commitment to a state mental hospital
because of her interpretation of a single inkblot in what is known as
the Rorschach inkblot test. While 40 of her 41 inkblot interpretations
were reasonable, she thought inkblot number eight looked like a bear
when it didn't to anybody else. Dr. Dawes says at a clinical staff
meeting "the head psychologist displayed card number eight to everyone
assembled and asked rhetorically: 'Does that look like a bear to you?'"
On the basis of this one inkblot interpretation the young woman was
"diagnosed" as schizophrenic and (italics are Dr. Dawes'): "
The staff
over my objection further agreed that if her parents were ever to bring
her back, she should be sent directly to the nearby state hospital. ... she may well have been condemned to serve time in that snake pit on the basis of a single Rorschach response."
________________________________________________________
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT TO A MENTAL HOSPITAL
BECAUSE OF WHAT A PERSON SEES IN AN INKBLOT?
________________________________________________________
Because of such observations, Dr. Dawes says in the Preface,
"My own decision to write this book has been motivated by two factors
in particular: anger, and a sense of social obligation. ... far too
much professional practice in psychology has grown and achieved status
by espousing principles that are known to be untrue and by employing
techniques known to be invalid." He agrees wholeheartedly with Boston
University psychology professor Margaret A. Hagen (quoted above) about
courtroom testimony by mental health professionals such as psychiatrists
and psychologists, of which he says—
But are they really the experts they claim to be? ...
Should their opinions be recognized in our courts as having any more
validity than the opinions of anyone else? In particular, are their
opinions any better than those of judges, who have been selected on the
basis of their legal record to make tough social decisions? Can these
mental health practitioners, for example, make a better determination of
whether a young child has been sexually abused than can be made of a
careful consideration of the evidence without considering their
opinions?
These questions have been studied quite extensively, often by
psychologists themselves. There is by now an impressive body of
research evidence indicating that the answer to these questions is
no. ... Professional psychologists and other mental health experts are
often willing to testify, and they have a profound impact on others'
lives in the absence of any evidence that what they do is valid. ...
Lacking such evidence, [they] should be thrown out of court. [pp. 4,
25]
The absurdity of many of the so-called mental disorders in the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
makes it seem the psychiatrists and others who wrote it did so as a
joke, and (really!) I have often laughed heartily while looking through
DSM-5. In fact, the laughs I've gotten while reading
DSM-5
have been worth the $149 I paid for the book. However, the
consequences of psychiatric and psychological "diagnosis" are often
anything but a laughing matter. The authors of the various editions of
the
DSM including
DSM-5 have written a ridiculous book,
but their "diagnoses" are accepted as valid in American courts and
elsewhere. Having one of the "mental disorders" in the
DSM too
often results in a life-changing psychiatric "diagnosis", a lifetime of
incarceration or involuntary outpatient treatment, or loss of many of
life's most important opportunities, such as admission to medical, law,
or other school, or qualifying for licensure in a lucrative occupation,
or being hired for a job.
This review of the lack of reliability and validity of
psychiatric diagnosis and the absurd notions in the American Psychiatric
Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
shows psychiatric diagnosis has nothing to do with health, nothing to
do with anything abnormal in the body including brain, nothing to do
with science, often nothing to do with common sense, and everything to
do with currently prevailing ideas about how a person ideally "should"
be as perceived by the people who wrote the various editions of the
DSM and those who use it for "diagnosis".
The bottom line is this: Psychiatric "diagnosis" is nonsense
and should be ignored by all. Psychiatric "diagnosis" serving as the
basis of state and federal laws and judgments of courts is the triumph
of pseudoscience over justice.
Recommended Reading
Books
Allen Frances, M.D.,
Saving Normal: An Insider's Revolt Against
Out-of-Control Psychiatric Diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the
Medicalization of Ordinary Life (HarperCollins 2013). In this essay
and others I have quoted some of Dr. Frances' statements with which I
agree, and I commend him for going as far as he does in debunking much
of what psychiatry is today. I disagree with his opinions, stated in
Saving Normal,
that there is such a thing as a true mental illness or disorder and
that psychiatry has bona-fide treatment. With the exception of
psychiatrists who entered psychiatry for the
purpose of
debunking or reforming it, it is undoubtedly difficult for a person to
admit he devoted his entire working life to a profession that is pure
quackery. I disagree with Dr. Frances' self-serving and self-justifying
claims about aspects of psychiatry he thinks are valid, but these
points of disagreement are less important than the criticisms of
psychiatry he makes in
Saving Normal.
Margaret A. Hagen, Ph.D.,
Whores of the Court: The Fraud of Psychiatric Testimony and the Rape of American Justice (ReganBooks 1997)
Articles
2009
Allen Frances, M.D., "A Warning Sign on the Road to DSM-V: Beware of
Unintended Consequences, psychiatrictimes.com, June 26, 2009
2010
Joanna Moncrieff, MBBS, MSc, FRCPsych, MD,
"Psychiatric diagnosis as a political device",
Social Theory & Health (2010) 8, 370-382. doi:10.1057/sth.2009.11
2011
Allen Frances, M.D., "Should Temper Tantrums Be Made Into A DSM-5 Diagnosis?", psychiatrictimes.com, October 13, 2011
Allen Frances, M.D., "Pediatricians Issue Dangerous New Treatment
Guidelines for Attention Deficit Disorder", psychiatrictimes.com,
psychologytoday.com, October 17, 2011: "...pediatricians can be just
as reckless as psychiatrists in their recommendations for Attention
Deficit
disorder (ADD)."
Allen Frances, M.D., "Psychologists Petition Against DSM-5: Users
Revolt Should Capture APA Attention", psychiatrictimes.com &
psychologytoday.com, October 24, 2011
Allen Frances, M.D., "What Would A Useful DSM-5 Look Like? And An
Update On the Petition Drive", psychiatrictimes.com, October 31, 2011
Allen Frances, M.D., "APA Responds Lamely to the Petition to Reform
DSM-5", psychiatrictimes.com & psychologytoday.com, November 8,
2011
Allen Frances, M.D., "DSM-5: Living Document or Dead on Arrival?", psychiatrictimes.com, November 11, 2011
Allen Frances, M.D., "Counsellors Turn Against DSM-5: Can APA Ignore
120,000 Users?, psychologytoday.com & psychiatrictimes.com,
November 17, 2011
Allen Frances, M.D., "Hebephilia is a Crime, Not a Mental Disorder", psychiatrictimes.com, December 15, 2011
Allen Frances, M.D., "APA Attempts to Defend Itself", psychiatrictimes.com, December 25, 2011
2012
Allen Frances, M.D., "A Response to 'How Reliable Is Reliable Enough?'", psychiatrictimes.com, January 18, 2012
Allen Frances, M.D., "DSM-5 and Diagnostic Inflation: Reply to the DSM-5 Task Force", psychiatrictimes.com, January 23, 2012
Allen Frances, M.D., "More Than 65,000 Grievers Must Be Heard-and Should Be Heeded", psychiatrictimes.com, March 6, 2012
Allen Frances, M.D., "Am I a Dangerous Man? No, but I Do Raise Twelve
Dangerous Questions", psychologytoday.com, psychiatrictimes.com, March
16, 2012
Allen Frances, M.D., "Internet Addiction-The Next New Fad Diagnosis", psychiatrictimes.com, August 14, 2012
Allen Frances, M.D., "Definitive Study Rejects the Diagnosis of 'Psychosis Risk' and Finds No Treatment Benefit",
huffingtonpost.com, psychiatrictimes.com, psychologytoday.com, April 16, 2012
2013
Allen Frances, M.D., "DSM-5 Confirms That Rape Is Crime, Not Mental Disorder", psychiatrictimes.com, February 21, 2013
Thomas Insel, M.D., "Director's Blog: Transforming Diagnosis", April 29, 2013,
nimh.nih.gov
Michael Mechanic, "Psychiatry's New Diagnostic Manual: 'Don't Buy It. Don't Use It. Don't Teach It.'",
May 14, 2013, motherjones.com
Recommended Videos
"Jeffrey A. Schaler, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology",
YouTube.com (2006). If you watch only one of the videos I recommend, this 9-minute video is
the one to watch.
"The DSM: Psychiatry's Deadliest Scam",
YouTube.com
I recommend the two above Citizens Commission on Human Rights (CCHR)
videos without endorsing CCHR itself nor the founder of CCHR, the Church
of
Scientology: See comment in
The Future of Antipsychiatry Activism
copyright 2014
Permission to reproduce is granted
provided the reproduction is accurate
and proper credit is given
The author is a volunteer (pro bono) attorney for the Law Project for Psychiatric Rights (psychrights.org) and may be reached at wayneramsay (at) mail (dot) com
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